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EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS-THE SANCTUARY
MOVEMENT: DEVELOPMENT AND POTENTIAL
FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
"... for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me
drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me."
Matthew 25:35'
"We believe that justice and mercy require that people of conscience actively
assert our God-given right to aid anyone fleeing from persecution and murder."
Letter from the Rev. John Fife
To Attorney General William
French Smith. 2
When the Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona declared itself
a "sanctuary" for Central American refugees in 1982, it created a new element
in an old conflict - the confrontation between church and state. Motivated by
religious principles and perceived inequities in the treatment of aliens from El
Salvador and Guatemala, that declaration marked the founding of a movement
of persons willing to disobey the law in order to extend aid to those fleeing Central
America. In response to the s;stematic deportation of aliens into areas which
critics claimed were hazardous, many churches and religious groups joined the
movement by sheltering those aliens from government prosecution. The circum-
stances surrounding these actions raised fundamental constitutional issues as those
prosecuted began to raise the potential of First Amendment protection for their
actions. Although rejected initially, new prosecutions insure that the issue will
arise again.
The issue of creating religious exemptions for conduct otherwise prohibited
by the government raises a delicate question in interpreting the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment. Any claim for preferential treatment based on religious
issues raises legitimate concerns regarding the extent to which personal belief should
determine the scope of compliance with government authority.
The United States Supreme Court has attempted to accommodate the com-
peting considerations in this area by predicating religious exemptions upon sat-
isfaction of a balancing test, set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder.' The application
Matthew 25:35 (Revised Standard Version).
2 Korn, Hiding In The Open, STUDENT LAW. JAUARY, 1986, at 28.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1
Levander: En El Nombre De Dios--The Sanctuary Movement: Development and Pot
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
of this test, and the weighing of the interests to be balanced, will determine the
feasibility of a religious exemption for the activity of sanctuary workers. It is the
purpose of this Note to consider the application of that test, and to speculate
on the feasibility of such an exemption.
In order to analyze the legal questions raised by the sanctuary movement,
its background must be examined. However, this is not intended as a definitive
history of sanctuary. 4 The movement raises important religious, moral, and po-
litical considerations that simply cannot be covered in the scope of this note.
Similarly, the legal issues raised extend far beyond the first amendment, and will
be developed only to the extent necessary to examine the free exercise analysis.,
Before the analysis can be undertaken however, it is important to understand the
conditions in Central America which have given rise to the influx of refugees to
whom sanctuary is being offered, and to have some background of United States
immigration law, under which the claims by refugees are evaluated.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Central America
The sanctuary movement was founded to give assistance to refugees from
Central America countries, primarily El Salvador and Guatemala. Thus, any un-
derstanding of sanctuary must begin with an examination of the political situation
in that region. This is necessary to understand not only the source of the refugees
to which the movement extends aid, but also the motivations of those involved
in sanctuary. It is also essential to explain the role which the U.S. government
has played in the treatment of refugees and those assisting them.
The current flood of aliens from Central America has been increasing dras-
tically in recent years, but is the result of conditions which have been in existence
for most of this century. These conditions in turn are a result of policies pursued
during this period by the governments of the United States and the respective
Central American countries. 6 In order to demonstrate this connection, a brief
examination of the recent history of El Salvador might be illuminative.
El Salvador, like most of Central America, has traditionally had an agrarian
economy with a fairly large peasant class. This system led to the extreme centraliza-
4 For a good overview of the development, historical context, and legal status of the sanctuary
movement see I. BAU, Tins GROUND iS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES
(1985). Another good source, covering the philosophical background and giving the perspective of
the refugees is R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY: THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1986).
1 See Comment, Eccumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenge to United States Refugee Policy,
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493 (1986) for a more extensive view of the legal issues raised by the
sanctuary movement.
I "It is only in the past ten years that we have begun to suffer the misfortunes, and to assist
the unfortunates who are the product of our foreign policy, which for the past half century has
supported anti-democratic forces in the Caribbean and Central and South America." Asylum Ad-
judcation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 49-50 (1981) (statement of Ira Kurzban, Counsel for
National Civil Liberties Committee).
[Vol. 89
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tion of land ownership and a highly inequitable distribution of wealth.7 It also
had a profound impact on the form of government of the country. The necessity
for keeping tight control over the peasant population led to the creation of strong
military organizations including the National Guard, which was formed in 1912.
This strong military force in turn exerted influence over the central government,
which continues to this day.
In 1932, a civilian president (Arturo Araujo) was forced out of office by the
military. The ascension of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez to power
marked the beginning of the Salvadoran army's domination in contemporary Sal-
vadoran politics.' A peasant revolt ensued, and six weeks later, in an action later
designated La Matanza (the massacre), government troops killed as many as 30,000
peasants and Indians, 9 a prelude to another practice of current significance. The
revolt was blamed on the local communist party, whose leader, Augustin Fara-
bundo Marti, was subsequently executed.' 0
The military continued to exercise almost uninterrupted control in Salvadoran
politics, and even stepped in to ensure the selection of its candidate in 1972 when
a civilian candidate (Jose Napolean Duarte) appeared to be winning the election."
Some signs of reform appeared in 1979, when a faction of the military containing
some progressive elements staged a coup against the existing military president.
This hope was quickly dashed however, as the more conservative elements of the
junta took over, forcing the civilians and reform elements of the military from
the government.'
2
At the same time the United States increased economic and military support
to the government of El Salvador. The United States has provided training and
supplies to El Salvador since the 1940s through the Military Assistance Program,
and later gave significant training to military groups through the Public Safety
Program. 3 However, in the period following the 1979 coup, economic and military
aid increased significantly. Initially, the military support was limited to advisors
serving in training roles and non-lethal aid (although licenses were provided to
private American companies to sell arms to the Salvadorans).' 4 The Carter admin-
istration began providing lethal aid to El Salvador in January of 1981, and the
levels were significantly increased by the Reagan administration following the
I "Before 1980, nearly half of El Salvador's farmland was held by only 0.2 percent of the
population." SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, S.Prt. 98-139, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., 10 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA].
3 AMERICAS WATCH Comm., REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, 6 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS].




REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 178-79.
" Id. at 183.
19861
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release of its "White Paper" in February of that year.' 5 The number of U.S.
military personnel in El Salvador was also increasing. By February 1981, fifty-
six such persons were serving in various support and training capacities.' 6 In the
period between 1979 and 1982, the United States provided a total of $300 million
in economic aid to El Salvador.' 7 Thus the United States was beginning to provide
significant support for the existing government of El Salvador.
Such support was deemed necessary because the level of violence within the
country was rising. Guerrilla groups had begun organizing in El Salvador in 1970,
and opposition to the government was growing. In October 1980, many of these
groups united under the common title of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front, or FMLN (which was named after the early communist leader). 8 The
conflict between government forces and the FMLN led to a significant increase
in tensions in the early 1980s. The violence, however, was not restricted to clashes
between the army and the guerrillas, but was increasingly directed against the
civilian population as well.
These developments caused a worsening in the human rights situation of El
Salvador, and a rise in the number of refugees. Amnesty International reported
that by mid-January 1980, an average of three corpses bearing evidence of torture
were discovered in El Salvador each day. 9 The overall civilian death toll rose
from an estimated 1,000 in 1979 to between 9,000 and 10,000 in 1980.0 In 1981,
a human rights organization reported more than 12,000 murders. 2' In addition
to those civilians killed outright, many "disappeared"-usually to turn up later
among the dead, and often showing signs of torture.22 These victims of the no-
torious "death squads" have received widespread attention. While accurate data
is difficult to collect, one U.S. government source estimated that in 1982 and
1983, disappearances were occurring at a rate of forty per month.23 Other sources
have placed the figure much higher.24
The source of political violence is unclear given the number of factions among
the combatants. While some responsibility may probably be placed on all groups
in the conflict, government forces are often named as the principal violators of
' R. BONNER, supra note 9, at 255-56.
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8 at 190.
I d. at 177.
" Id. at 16.
" AMNESTY INT'L, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, 133 (1980).
' REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 37.
Id. at 278 (Citing figures reported by Socorro Juridico).
"Disappearances is the term applied to the politically motivated abduction of individuals by
government security forces, or by paramilitary groups with the complicity or consent of the govern-
ment." Id. at 61. The occurrence of disappearances has been noted by U.S. courts. See, e.g., Orantes-
Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 357 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
' REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 7, at 16.
21 Amnesty International reported 472 disappearances between May 1, 1980 and April 30, 1981.
Socorro Juridico recorded 602 disappearances between October 15, 1979 and March 27, 1981. REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 65.
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human rights in the area.21 Much of the "death squad" activity has been attributed
to government forces operating unofficially. 26 Amnesty International has even gone
so far as to conclude that, "the majority of the reported abuses against non-
combatant civilians have been inflicted by forces under the authorities' control
and that most so-called 'death-squads' are in fact made up of members of the
Salvadoran security and military forces acting under direct orders of superior
officers.
' 27
This pattern of violence has continued, in varying degrees, to the present day.
It has received widespread attention in this country following the killings of high
visibility figures or North Americans, such as the assassination of Archbishop
Oscar Romero or the deaths of four American churchwomen (both in 1980).28 It
can be said that conditions have recently improved; but, as the Senate Judiciary
Committee staff noted in 1983, "[ilt is unfortunate that the political murder of
200 to 400 persons a month is considered an improvement of human rights. Yet,
in El Salvador it is considered 'progress' since the toll of mutilated bodies along
its streets has dropped from a monthly rate of 800 to 900 a month. ' 29 Recent
reports indicate that significant abuses still continue. The result of the violence
against civilians has been that more people have died from political violence than
have been killed in combat.3 0
This unrest has created a massive flight in recent years of Salvadoran refugees
fleeing the violence.3 In 1983, one source estimated that over ten percent of the
entire population of El Salvador was either displaced within the country or had
fled across its borders.3 2 The resulting refugee flow has spread across Central
America33 and into the United States. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) currently intercepts over 1,000 Salvadorans a month, but believes
that this may represent only 25% of the total number entering the United States.34
Estimates of the number of Salvadorans in this country range as high as 500,000.11
It is this population which has presented a problem for American immigration
2 SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM. CENTRAL AMERICA: TREADING DANGEROUS WATERS, S.
Prt. 98-115, 98 Cong. 1st Sess., 5 (1983).
2 Amicus Brief for National Council of Churches, United States v. Merkt. 764 F.2d 266 (5th
Cir. 1985), (citing AMNESTY INT'L., EXTRASUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN EL SALVADOR, 16 (1983)).
27 AMNESTY INT'L., CURRENT CONCERNS IN EL SALVADOR, 1-2 (1985), cited in Statement of
Morton Halperin, for ACLU, Before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, November 7, 1985, 5 [hereinafter cited as Halpern Statement].
-" R. BONNER, supra note 9, at 74-80 (churchwomen) 178-79 (Archbishop Romero).
-' REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 7, at 16.
Io d. At least one federal court has taken judicial notice of the dangerous conditions in El
Salvador. See Orantes-Hernandez, 541 F. Supp. at 355-58.
"1 "The Salvadoran flow has been increasing in recent years, and authorities believe the increase
is directly related to the violence and economic dislocation resulting from civil unrest in El Salvador."
Stephan, U.S. Policy Towards Undocumented Salvadorans, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 1 (1986).
" REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 7, at 1.
" See Table compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, reprinted in
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 165.
' Stephan, supra note 31, at I.
" REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 7, at 4.
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law, and which ultimately has become the recipient of assistance from the sanc-
tuary movement.
B. U.S. Immigration Law
The legal status of Central Americans reaching this country is determined by
the immigration laws of the United States. The provisions of immigration law at
issue are those relating to refugee status-recognizing the rights of a person fleeing
persecution in their home country. This right has developed somewhat haphazardly
over the years and has only recently been granted to all persons entering this
country. The interpretation of its scope lies at the heart of the present controversy.
Refugees have been admitted into this country on an ad hoc basis over the
years, through laws such as the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.36 The general
rights of a refugee fleeing persecution were first recognized in the 1950 Internal
Security Act, 37 which gave the Attorney General discretionary authority to with-
hold deportation of persons subject to persecution in their own country. A similar
provision was included in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (hereinafter
INA)28 However, this power was still entirely discretionary and was often applied
following political criteria. 9
The INA was amended in 1965 to include a special class within the general
immigration law under which refugees meeting statutory criteria could enter the
United States.4' Under the so-called "seventh preference," the alien was required
to prove: 1) that they had come from a communist country, or one in the Middle
East; 2) that the departure was the equivalent of flight; 3) that the flight was
motivated by persecution, or fear of persecution, based on race, religion, or po-
litical opinions; and, 4) that the alien was unwilling or unable to return.4' The
use of the "seventh preference" had several shortcomings as a means for admitting
refugees. It retained a political bias in allowing admission to certain groups of
refugees over others, thus, imposing a double standard. 42 It also raised a more
fundamental problem-inconsistency with international law.
The United Nations had addressed the issue of refugees in 1951, when the
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
I Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948); See also Comment,
Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
295 (1985).
" Internal Security Act of 1950, § 20a, Pub. L. No. 811, 64 Stat. 987, 1010 (1950).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(h), Pub. L. No. 300, [hereinafter cited as
INA]. 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952).
19 "[Tlhis discretion was used only as a part of a broader Cold War foreign policy rather than
because of humanitarian considerations." I. BAu, supra note 4, at 45.
INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7), superseded by 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1980).
Leivbowitz, The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional Concerns, ANNALS OF
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, May 1983, 163, 164.
11 Note, Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice. 7 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 107, 124 (1978).
[Vol. 89
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Persons defined "refugee," and extended significant protections to them in the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 43 A refugee was defined as one
who:
[O1wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country.'
Under the Convention, refugees were afforded the protection of nonrefoulement.
45
This prevented the government from deporting those who met the definition of
a "well-founded fear of being persecuted."
The original protection was limited to refugees from events occurring prior
to 1951, and could be restricted to European refugees, if the signatory so chose.
46
These restrictions were lifted in 1967 when the United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees was adopted. 4 7 The 1967 Protocol adopted the definition
of refugee from the 1951 Convention without geographical or temporal restric-
tions.
Although not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, the United States was a
party to the 1967 Protocol. Thus, the U.S. would presumably be bound by the
definition of a refugee as one possessing a well-founded fear of persecution. 48
This obviously conflicted to some degree with the "seventh preference" category
which was restricted to those fleeing countries with communist governments, or
which were located in the Middle East.49 This conflict was resolved, at least facially,
by the congressional enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.
The Refugee Act adopted the language used in the 1951 Convention by de-
fining a refugee as one outside their native country or country of residence, who
is "unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion." 0 The adoption of this language was intended to apply refugee status to all
those who met the U.N. definition."' In addition to clarifying the definition of
19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
Convention Relating to Status of Refugees of 1951, art. l(a)(2) [hereinafter cited as 1951
Convention].
1' "Refouler is a French word meaning to expel or return." I. BAU, supra note 4, at 48. Non-
refoulement was first established in the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Ref-
ugees (159 L.N.T.S. 199), and refers to a prohibition upon returning an alien to the country from
which he came.
1951 Convention, art. I(B).
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
4' See U.S. CoNsr. art. VI.
See Note, supra note 42, at 128-29.
"' INA, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 Ir'L MIGRATION REv. 141, 143 (1981): Comment, supra
note 36 at 302.
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refugee, the 1980 act also recognized for the first time a right of those already
in this country to apply for asylum.5 2 This right was guaranteed through the
establishment of a set of procedures through which that right would be adju-
dicated. The process of adjudication was extremely important because the INA
recognized the international principal of nonrefoulement in § 243 (h) which pro-
hibits deportation of an alien where there is a finding that the alien's life would
be endangered.5
To apply for asylum, the alien initially files an application with the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service."' The application involves giving information in-
cluding prior instances of detention in the applicant's home country, an opinion
as to what would happen if they returned and their willingness to do so, prior
activities by the applicant which they believe would result in persecution upon
return, any mistreatment by authorities, and the likely effect of current condi-
tions in the applicant's home country on their freedom if they returned." The ap-
plicant is then interviewed by an INS officer, who forwards the application to the
INS District Director.5 6 In reviewing the application, the District Director also
considers an advisory opinion submitted by the Department of State (Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) which is prepared by the diplomatic
desk for the home country of the applicant. This advisory opinion is not mandated
by the Refugee Act, but is required in the INS regulations.7 There is no direct
review of a denial of asylum, but the issue may be raised in subsequent deportation
proceedings before an Immigration Judge, the decision of which may be reviewed
by the Board of Immigration Appeals, and then by the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals.1
8
The outcome of the process essentially depends on the determination of what
is a "well-founded fear of persecution. " 9 This requirement, as applied in the
context of the U.N. Convention and Protocol, is determined at least partially
through the subjective frame of mind of the applicant 0 This subjective element
5. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158. An alien applying for protection under the Act from inside
the United States is applying for asylum. The same alien applying for the same protection from a
point outside the United States is seeking to become a refugee. While there is a technical difference
between refugee status and asylee status, they are adjudicated under the same standards by almost
identical procedures. Therefore no distinction will be drawn between the two for purposes of this
article.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1986).
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Form 1-589, Questions
31-38.
- 8 C.F.R. § 208.6.
51 Id. § 208.7
51 Id. § 3.1 (Board of Immigration Appeal); 8 U.S.C. § Il05a(a) (Ct. of Appeals).
"' For an examination of the origins of this phrase and its application in international law, see
Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted". The Sources and Application of a Criterion of
Refugee Status, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 333 (1984).
1 Id. at 351-52. Cox infers two propositions from the requirements of the Protocol: "[Flirst,
any interpretation which is primarily objective and only secondarily subjective is inconsistent with
Protocol mandates; and second, any State that demands objective proof but fails to assist the person
in developing such proof is failing to implement the Protocol fully." (citations omitted) Id. at 352.
[Vol. 89
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has been recognized by the international body charged with administering the
Convention and Protocol-the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
(UNHCR). The UNHCR Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status (hereinafter the UNHCR Handbook) emphasizes both the sub-
jective and objective components to a claim of persecution. 6 The subjective ele-
ment of the determination is based upon the applicant's testimony, and takes into
consideration their opinions and feelings. This is weighed with objective criteria
relating to the credibility of the applicants' testimony, such as testimony from
other sources and conditions in the country from which the applicant has fled. 62
The standard for a "well-founded fear" applied to determinations made under
the identical language contained in the Refugee Act of 1980 has been less than
clear.63 Although the UNHCR Handbook has been cited with approval by federal
courts in the determination process,"4 it has never been adopted per se in adju-
dicating claims under the Refugee Act. Consequently, many claims continue to
be denied by the INS for lack of an objective showing by the alien that they are
subject to a well founded fear of persecution. 65
Perhaps more serious than the difference in standards is the fact that the rate
of denials differ between countries, indicating that politics may play a role in
asylum adjudication. The standards do indicate disparate treatment. In fiscal year
1985, the INS reported that 3.1% of the Salvadoran asylum applications which
were decided had been approved. This represented an improvement over the pre-
vious year, in which the approval rate was 2.45%. Cumulatively, the Salvadoran
approval rate in asylum adjudications between 1981 and 1985 was 2.7%. 66 Sal-
vadorans, however, were faring well when compared to Guatemalan asylum ap-
plicants, who enjoyed a success rate of 0.39% in FY 1984 (3 claims granted out
of 761 adjudicated). 67 By comparison, the asylum approval rate for all applicants
was roughly 20%; and was 12.3% for Nicaraguans, 32.7% for Poles, 40.9% for
Afghans, and 60.9% for Iranians.
6
The official response to charges that the INS takes political considerations
into account when deciding asylum claims is that most Salvadorans and Gua-
temalans are economic rather than political refugees. 69 Furthermore, INS sup-
61 1. BAU, supra note 4, at 69 n. 182 (citing the UNHCR Handbook on Procedure and Criteria
for Determining Refugee status).
- Id.
61 See Comment, Political Asylum and Withholding of Deportation: Defining the Appropriate
Standard of Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171. 188-92 (1983).
- See, e.g., Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
61 Application of a strict objective standard is particularly difficult where there is widespread
civil strife. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1985, at 14, col. 6.
61 INS statistics cited in Halpern statement, supra note 27, Table 1.
6 I. BAU, supra note 4, at 60.
6 Id.
t REFUGEE PROBLEM IN CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 7, at 20; Stephan supra note 31, at 2;
see also Preston, Assylum Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees'
Rights and U.S. International Obligations? 45 MD. L. REV. 91, 120 (1986).
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porters charge that those being deported do not have a well-founded fear of
persecution, as indicated by the fact that there is no evidence that those deported
are subject to persecution upon their return.7 0 This contention is strongly
contested 7' by groups that claim to have collected evidence that such persecution
does in fact occur. 72 The existence of widespread, generalized violence makes it
difficult to determine when an individual is personally subject to fear of perse-
cution. 73
Critics of the present practices charge that the actual motivation for wide-
spread denial of asylum claims by Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees is po-
litical-the U.S. government is reluctant to grant political asylum to refugees from
countries with which it is on good terms.7 4 The problem stems from the fact that
the State Department, which is charged with maintaining diplomatic ties with
foreign nations, also influences the asylum decision-through its advisory opin-
ions.75 This raises the possiblility that officials will consider diplomatic concerns
when deciding the merits of an asylum claim, perhaps at the expense of the
individual case. For example, a State Department Desk Officer once noted that
"[tihere is no question that when we grant asylum to a refugee from a govern-
ment . . . with which we are friendly, the government feels that its reputation is
slighted, its honor impugned. This can only lead to resentment against the United
States and both governments lose out."' 76 Another desk officer articulated the
same concern in commenting on a denial in a particular case. "We didn't grant
him asylum because the United States government doesn't want to pass judgment
on the internal conditions of allied countries. That would cause resentment on
their part and hurt the bilateral relationship."
7 7
In the context of contemporary Central America, it is obvious that the United
States is heavily supporting the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. As
noted earlier, the U.S. government has committed a significant amount of re-
sources to the Salvadoran government (in economic and military aid) during the
current conflict to stabilize the present government . 7  Thus, diplomatic consid-
70 "Salvadorans who are currently being returned. . . are subject to the same violence every
resident of that country faces, but there is clear evidence that there is no governmentally sanctioned
program to target or harass returning Salvadorans simply because they have been in the United States."
REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 7, at 4-5.
"' The Administration supports [continued deportation] on the premise that no evidence
exists that persons have been persecuted in El Salvador because they were deported from
the United States. This argument is disingenuous. There is substantial evidence that persons
have been persecuted in El Salvador after their forced return from the United States.
Halpern statement, supra note 27, at 9 (emphasis in original). See also CHICAGO RELIGIOUS TASK
FORCE ON CENTRA . AMERICA, SANCTUARY: A JUSTICE MINISTRY, 13-14 (undated pamphlet).
'. Halpern statement, supra note 27, at 9-12.
' Leibowitz, supra note 41, at 168.
14 See e.g., I. BAu, supra note 4, at 72-3; Korn, supra note 2 at 26.
7, See Preston, supra note 69.
7 Note, supra note 42 at 134.
7, Id. at 135. See also Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.l (9th Cir. 1968) for a judicial
recognition of the inherent limitations on the role of advisory opinions.
"7 See supra, notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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erations may well be present in making asylum determinations. In fact, an internal
INS statement has noted that there are varying standards for applicants, in that
"different levels of proof are required of different asylum applicants. In other
words, certain nationalities appear to benefit from presumptive status while others
do not.79 For example, for an El Salvadoran national to receive a favorable ad-
visory opinion, he or she must have 'a classic textbook case.' "SO The United
Nations High Commissioner has been critical of the method by which the U.S.
makes asylum determinations. A UNHCR evaluation of U.S. procedures in 1981
led to an expression of concern that the United States was not living up to its
responsibilities under the Protocol, and concluded that "there is a systematic
practice designed to forcibly return Salvadorans, irrespective of the merits of their
asylum claims." 8'
Reports suggesting that the United States was failing to adequately respond
to a legitimate need created a perception in the early 1980s that something further
needed to be done. Individuals began to aid Central American refugees in response
to their belief that the government was committed to deporting aliens into po-
tentially life-threatening situations. Motivated by religious and humanitarian con-
cerns, these individuals eventually came to form the sanctuary movement.
Ill. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
A. Historical Basis
When contemporary American churches began declaring themselves sanctuary
for refugees, they did not create a new concept. The right of sanctuary has been
recognized in various contexts since biblical times. In the Bible, entire cities were
recognized as refuge, where persons who had accidentally caused a death could
escape retribution from relatives of the deceased. So long as the refugee remained
in the city, they could not be harmed or forcibly turned out.
8 2
The right to sanctuary was later recognized as applying specifically to churches,
and was used in England-subject to certain restrictions. In fact the Catholic church
sanctioned the practice in its Canon law for a period of time.4 However, sanctuary
was prohibited in England by the time the United States gained independence, and
independence, and thus it was never recognized in U.S. jurisprudence. 85 Therefore,
'9 Magnuson, Double Standard for Refugees?: A Split Over Sanctuary, TiMEs (Apr. 28, 1986).
- INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMI-
GRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1982), quoted in Halpern statement, supra note 27, at 7.
Is REPORT OF THE UNHCR MISSION TO MONITOR INS ASYLUM PROCESSING OF SALVADORAN IL-
LEGAL ENTRANTS, Sept. 13-18, 1981, reprinted at 128 CONG. REC. S 830, (daily ed. Feb. II, 1982).
"- For example, "These... cities shall be for refuge for the people of Israel, and for the stranger
and for the sojourner among them, that any one who kills any person without intent may flee there."
Numbers 35:15. See generally, Numbers 35:6-34, Deuteronomy 19:1-10, Joshua 20:1-9, and Exodus
21:12-14.
Amicus Brief, supra note 26, at 15-17. See generally, I. BAU, supra note 4, at 6.
" "A church enjoys the right of asylum, so that guilty persons who take refuge in it must not
be taken from it .... " CODE. OF CANON LAW OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH; canon 1179.
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thus it was never recognized in U.S. jurisprudence." Therefore, any legal basis
for the contemporary sanctuary movement must be found on other grounds.
In spite of the lack of official recognition of sanctuary in United States his-
tory, a comparison with participants in the Underground Railroad prior to the
Civil War would seem to give contemporary sanctuary some basis in American
tradition.8 6 Such a comparison would be of limited utility however, because "the
churches providing sanctuary [to ftugitive slaves] did not seek to claim a legal
privilege, but only sought to respond to religious commands regarding hospi-
tality. ' 8 7 Thus, the Underground Railroad, while enjoying significant church
support ss was more analagous to a form of civil disobedience than to an exercise
of a legal privilege. The exercise of civil disobedience provides very little direct
protection to the actions of the participant in the short term, because the exercise
presupposes the willingness to accept the consequences of the act to draw attention
to the inequity of the enforcement.Y9
This point is illustrated by the experiences of the only group in contemporary
United States history to attempt to invoke sanctuary. During the Vietnam War,
various churches (and other groups) declared themselves to be sanctuaries, and
offered refuge to draft resisters and AWOL soldiers. 90 These sancturaries, how-
ever, claimed no special privileges, and instead operated in the context of a larger
political movement-antiwar protests. Furthermore, all those seeking sanctuary
were prosecuted, and accepted their punishment.9' Therefore, in considering the
development of the present sanctuary movement, it must be remembered that
sanctuary per se receives no protection, but that individuals involved in the move-
ment are protected by constitutional guarantees. Any protection or legal privilege
available to those involved in sanctuary will consequently stem from individual
rights rather than group-based protection.
B. Development of the Contemporary Movement
The current manifestation of sanctuary arose from a perception by religious
people in the southwestern United States that the swelling population of Central
American refugees represented a problem which was not being adequately con-
fronted by official means. Refugees were crossing the border in increasing numbers
due to conditions in their own countries, 92 and those passing through government
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
See, e.g., Korn, supra note 2, at 25. For a more sophisticated development of the analogy,
see R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4.
" I. BAU, supra note 4, at 160.
See W. SIEBERT, -THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM, 93-98 (1898,
reissued 1967).
'' "Under a government which imprisons apy unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a
prison." H. Thoreau. Civil Disobedience, WoRKs OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU. 430 (1981).
-' I. BAU. supra note 4, at 167-71.
9' Id. at 169.
12 For a collection of first-hand accounts from refugees who have left Central America, See R.
GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 8-11, 32-37, 64-67, 97-99, 125-28, 159-62, and 181-86.
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channels were being deported back to those countries in almost equal number.
As U.S. citizens became aware of these facts, and the apparent contradiction
between U.S. policies and U.S. legal obligations, many people became convinced
that individual action was necessary. 93
Although the sanctuary movement began on a grassroots level from activities
that were occurring simultaneously in several areas, 94 the two people most often
credited with founding modern sanctuary are the Rev. John Fife, of the Southside
Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona, and Jim Corbett, a Quaker and rancher
who lives in that area.9 Fife became interested in the problems of Central Amer-
ican refugees in the summer of 1980, when a "coyote" (professional alien smug-
gler) left a group of aliens in the desert nearby, which led to the deaths of half
of them. 96 When the INS announced that the rest were to be deported, Fife and
his church became involved. He organized a prayer vigil for the Central Amer-
icans, which led to meetings among persons concerned with refugee issues.97 In
the spring of 1981, Fife and other persons concerned with this situation created
a Task Force on Central America under the Tucson Ecumenical Council. 9 This
organization focused its activities on aiding detained aliens through legal means-
providing legal services and bond money to those in detention, and providing
housing to those who had been legally released. 99
The other person given credit for starting the current movement was Jim Corbett.
He became aware of the plight of refugees in the spring of 1981, when a friend
in a van belonging to Corbett was stopped at a border patrol roadblock, and a
Salvadoran hitchhiker riding in the van was detained.'00 In checking on the status
of this refugee, Corbett became involved in the entire INS detention and de-
portation process.'' By the summer of 1981, Corbett was harboring in his home
aliens who were applying for refugee status and urging other Quakers in the area
to do the same. 02 These activities led him to aiding refugees who were in this
country illegally - in some cases smuggling them in himself-and first brought
him into contact with Fife and other religious leaders in Tucson.
Corbett began encouraging Fife to involve Southside Presbyterian more di-
rectly in aiding refugees by sheltering undocumented aliens. 0 3 The church decided
to do so, and for a period of time provided covert assistance to Central American
91 For a description of the motivations of some of the leaders of the movement see Interview,
Conspiracy of Compassion, SOJOURNERS, 14-18, March, 1985, (interview with S. Merkt, J. Fife, J.
Corbett and P. Willis-Conger) [hereinafter cited as Interview].
1" I. BAU, supra note 4, at 12. R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 48.
" Korn, supra note 2, at 28.




"' R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 39.
Interview, supra note 93, at 15.
" Korn, supra note 2, at 28.
" ' Interview, supra note 93, at 16-17.
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refugees.' ° When it became obvious that such a project could not be carried out
in secret, church leaders decided to make their actions public and to tie them
into the historical tradition of sanctuary. The congregation of Southside Pres-
byterian voted to declare itself a public sanctuary and to publicly welcome a
refugee family into the church10s On March 24, 1982, the second anniversary of
the assasination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, Southside Presbyterian and several
other churches across the nation'06 held ceremonies to mark their declaration of
sanctuary. In addition, Rev. Fife sent a letter to the U.S. Attorney General ex-
plaining the position of the sanctuary movement:
We take this action because we believe the current policy and practice of the U.S.
government with regard to Central American refugees is illegal and immoral. We
believe our government is in violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and international
law by continuing to arrest, detain, and forcibly return refugees to the terror,
persecution, and murder in El Salvador and Guatemala.
We believe that justice and mercy require that people of conscience actively assert
our God-given right to aid anyone fleeing from persecution and murder. The
current administration of the United States law prohibits us from sheltering these
refugees from Central America. Therefore we believe that administration of the
law is immoral as well as illegal.'0
This statement of the position of sanctuary supporters stresses not only the
legal arguments regarding refugee status, but the religious motivations behind the
movement as well. The religious belief component is vital, because this belief is
what motivates many otherwise law-abiding people to engage in sanctuary ac-
tivity. 08 Materials distributed by the movement stress that giving sanctuary in-
volves an expression of compassion, a resistance to injustice, and an act of
hospitality, all rooted in the Christian tradition.' 9 Thus, the movement operates
through churches, and the decisions about extending sanctuary are made by con-
gregations on religious grounds." 0
The initial participants in sanctuary were primarily churches in the southwest.
As the number of churches grew, and their geographic diversity increased, it
became clear that some central coordination was needed. In the summer of 1982,
Jim Corbett met with representatives of the Chicago Religious Task Force on
Central America (hereinafter CRTF). The CRTF, which had been involved in
'I Id. at 17.
103 Id.
Five churches in California (East Bay area) also declared themselves sanctuary on the same
day (R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 48), in addition to a church in Washington, D.C.,
and one in New York. Interview supra note 93, at 17.
1w Korn, supra note 2, at 28.
' See e.g., Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1984, at I, for a description of the process by which
a conservative midwestern church reached the decision to declare sanctuary.
"o CHICAGO RELIGIOUS TAsK FORCE ON CENTRAL AMERICA, SANCTUARY: A JUSTICE MINISTRY, 4-
5 (undated pamphlet.)
,1o Id. at 15-18.
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political activities relating to Central America, later agreed to serve in a coor-
dinating capacity."' They provide a number of support services for the sanctuary
movement, including the publication of Basta!, a newsletter which provides com-
munication between local groups.
The CRTF also publishes several manuals to help churches interested in de-
claring themselves to be sanctuary,"'2 and initially sent out organizers to those
churches until the overwhelming response made this prohibitive."3 CRTF takes
requests for refugees from churches that have declared themselves sanctuary, and
provides refugees who contact the sanctuary movement with the names of sym-
pathy churches. The Task Force even employed a full-time coordinator in the
border area-Sister Darlene Nicgorski-who screened incoming refugees for par-
ticipation in sanctuary." 4
Once refugees have agreed to go to a specific church, they are transported
there by the sanctuary movement. Public caravans have been used to help draw
attention to the plight of the refugees."' After the refugees reach a sanctuary,
they are encouraged to speak out about the conditions in their home country
which drove them to the United States. Thus, the movement provides shelter for
the refugee and raises public awareness about the conditions in Central America.
It should be noted that not all refugees go into public sanctuary; many are simply
helped in reaching and settling in areas of the U.S. with large Central American
populations."1
6
The initial response of the authorities was generally to ignore the movement,
apparently in hopes of not creating any publicity for it. "17 The number of churches
involved continued to grow, however, and by May of 1985 the CRTF reported
that there were 307 declared sanctuaries in the United States." 8 The concept also
began spreading beyond the context of churches. There are presently 22 cities
which declare themselves to be sanctuary, including Los Angeles and Seattle, as
well as the state of New Mexico.' 9
"I BASTA!, Jan., 1985, (Newsletter of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America).
See also, R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 48.
112 See SANTUARY: A JUSTICE MINISTRY (undated); PUBLIC SANCTUARY FOR SALVADORAN AND
GUATEMALAN REFUGEES, ORGANIZER'S NUTS & BOLTS; (undated); SANCTUARY AND THE LAW: A GUIDE
FOR CONGREGATIONS (1984).
" R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 53.
" I. BAU, supra note 4, at 84.
"' See Sanctuary Caravan Rolls, BASTA!, April 1984, 2; Basta Ya! A Caravan and Action of
Resistance and Conscience, BASTA!, Jan. 1985, 1; and Dale, National Caravan Freedom Train Rides
Again, BASTA!, Oct. 1985, 1.
136 Korn, supra note 2, at 29.
"' R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 44, 47, and 71; 1. BAU, supra note 4, at 87-
88. (Statements by INS officials.)
" BASTA!, June 1986, 28. The denominations containing the most public sanctuaries were: Friends
(with 50 sanctuaries declared), Catholics (49), Unitarian (47), Presbyterian (29), and United Church
of Christ (14). The heaviest concentrations of sanctuaries were in California (containing 106 declared
sanctuaries), Wisconsin (15), New York (19), Arizona (20), and Illinois (22).
" Magnuson, Double Standard for Refugees?, TIME, 34 (April 28, 1986).
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The movement began to garner support from the leadership bodies of various
denominations. For example, in 1984, the United Methodist Church adopted a
resolution calling on congregations to "resist the policy of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service by declaring their churches to be 'sanctuaries' for refugees
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and other areas of the Carribean and Latin Amer-
ica."120 Other declarations of support have come from the American Baptist Church,
American Lutheran Church, Disciples of Christ, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
United Church of Christ, American Friends Service Committee,' 2' Unitarian Uni-
versalist Association,'2 and the (Catholic) Conference of Major Superiors of Men.2 3
C. Governmental Response
In spite of widespread publicity surrounding the activities of the sanctuary
movement-activities which were illegal under existing law-the U.S. government
initially refrained from taking on the movement directly. 24 However, prosecutions
were begun in 1984 against individual sanctuary workers. 25 The only successful
prosecutions in this period were against employees of Casa Oscar Romero. 26 Casa
Romero, in San Benito, Texas, was founded by the Catholic Bishop of Browns-
ville, and provides food and shelter to refugees, without regard to the legal status
of the alien. 2 7 The first worker from the shelter to be arrested was Stacey Merkt,
who was stopped by the border patrol in Texas on February 17, 1984.128 She was
charged with transporting illegal aliens in violation of § 274 of the INA," 9 a
charge which carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and a $2,000
fine. She was convicted of the charge in May, and was sentenced to two years
probation (and given a 90 day suspended sentence). 3 ' In June of 1985, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial.,',
Although some groups had initially urged reversal on the grounds of religious
"0 United Methodist Church, BooK oF RESOLUTIONS, 281-82 (1984). See also Res. No. 8549,
adopted by the Disciples of Christ at its convention, Aug. 2-7, 1985, resolving to "[a]ffirm the religious
and moral rights churches and synagogues to provide sanctuary and protection for those fleeing
persecution as an age-old expression of the biblical tradition of our faiths ....
N.Y. Times, supra note 65, at 14, col. 2.
R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, 157.
' Id. at 179. See also R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, Appendix 2 ("Religious
Leaders' Affirmation of Sanctuary Ministry").
1'- This inaction had the incongruous effect of creating a de facto recognition of sanctuary
privilege by the government, See I. BAU, supra note 4, at 89.
,21 The legal liability of those involved in sanctuary is discussed fully in SANCTUARY AND THE
LAW: A GUIDE FOR CONGREGATIONS, published by the CRTF.
126 Philip Willis-Conger, Project Director of the Tucson Ecumenical Council's Task Force on
Central America, was arrested, but the charges were dropped due to faulty arrest procedures. 1. BAU,
supra note 4, at 79-80.
12' Amicus Brief, supra note 26, at 9-10.
' I. BAU, supra note 4, at 76.
' 8 U.S.C. § 78-79.
"" I. BAU, supra note 4, at 78-79.
' United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985).
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freedom, 3 2 the court ultimately reversed on the grounds that the trial court mis-
stated an element of the offense in instructing the jury.
3
The second Casa Romero worker to be arrested was its director, Jack Elder.
In April 1984, Elder was also indicted on similar charges. 34 During his trial,
Elder's attorneys attempted to have the charges dismissed on the grounds that
the prosecution violated Elder's First Amendment rights to the free exercise of
religion. The trial court judge rejected this assertion in a published decision, which
is the only written opinion dealing with the free exercise clause as applied to the
sanctuary movement. 35 The rejection of this defense was irrelevant however, be-
cause on January 24, 1985, the jury acquitted Elder of the charges.
3 6
This was not the end of Elder's troubles. In December, 1984, prior to his
first trial, Elder had been indicted again on charges of aiding illegal aliens. The
indictment also named Stacy Merkt, who was serving her probation awaiting her
appeal to the Fifth Circuit. They were both convicted, and on March 27, 1985
the first criminal penalties were imposed against sanctuary workers. Elder had
been offered parole if he agreed to disassociate himself from the sanctuary move-
ment. He refused. The judge then imposed a one year sentence, which was later
reduced to five months (Elder served 135 days in a halfway house, and was
released for good behavior). 37 Merkt was sentenced to six months (and her earlier
90 day suspended sentence was reimposed), but was allowed to remain free on
bond pending appeal.'38
In the meantime, Lorry Thomas had taken over as the director of Casa Oscar
Romero. On May 12, 1985, Thomas was stopped by the INS while transporting
an undocumented alien. She plead guilty to the charge, and on June 20 she was
sentenced to two years imprisonment.
39
This level of response, while indicating an increasing government interest in
stifling the movement, was fairly mild considering possible government reaction.
By the time Lorry Thomas was arrested, the CRTF was reporting that there were
225 public sanctuaries operating openly in the Untied States. The opportunities
for arrests were numerous, but they were not taken initially. That changed on
January 14, 1985, when a federal grand jury in Phoenix, Arizona indicted sixteen
people involved with sanctuary on seventy-one counts involving conspiracy and
"-2 Amicus Brief, supra note 26. The amicus brief was filed by the National Council of Churches
of Christ, U.S.A.; Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.); Friends United Meeting, American Lutheran Church,
Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, United Church of Christ, and the Department of
Church in Society Division of Homeland Ministries Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).
M Merkt, 764 F.2d at 268.
"u I. BAU, supra note 4, at 80-81.
" United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985). For a detailed discussion of this
opinion, see section IV(B) infra.
I. BAU, supra note 4, at 81.
Id. at 83.
"' Id.
" Charleston Gazette, June 21, 1985, at 8A.
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the transportation of undocumented aliens.' 40 The indictments culminated a ten
month undercover investigation of the sanctuary movement. 4 Among those in-
dicted were the Rev. John Fife, Jim Corbett, Philip Willis-Conger (from the
Tucson Ecumenical Council's Task Force on Central America), and Sister Darlene
Nicgorski (who had worked for CRTF in the border area). Of the original sixteen
defendants, charges against five were dropped for various reasons, leaving eleven
sanctuary workers to stand trial in Tucson.
The government gathered information for this trial through an undercover
operation known as "Operation Sojourner.' ' 42 The investigation involved using
informants to infiltrate the movement in order to gather information. The in-
formants, Salomon Graham and Jesus Cruz, wore recording devices into meetings
dealing with sanctuary including those held in churches and carried out in the
context of religious services. 43 These informants were not INS officers or law
enforcement professionals, but were former "coyotes" who had been caught by
the INS and who were paid more than $16,000 for their infiltration efforts.'"4
These activities marked a new phase in the government's treatment of sanctuary,
not only because agents were entering churches, but also because such entries
were carried out without a warrant.
The infiltration and clandestine taping in churches raised a storm of protest
from religious groups across the country.' 41 The investigatory tactics alone raised
a potential First Amendment claim by sanctuary due to the possibility that such
actions might exert a "chilling effect" over the free exercise of religion. 46 For
example, Alzona Evangelical Lutheran Church in Phoenix, Arizona had been
holding a regular Bible class which drew a number of Central American refugees,
including Jesus Cruz. After the indictments were announced and many of those
in the class were arrested, the class broke up. 47
Concern that the investigation was not entirely within the bounds of the Con-
stitution led to a civil suit filed against the government by a number of churches.
4
The plaintiffs include the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), American Lutheran
,, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1985, at 1.
14 See Ovryn, Targeting the Sanctuary Movement, BASTA!, Oct. 1985, 14 (reprinted from COVE RT
ACTION, Summer 1985).
,42 See, Tolan and Bassett, Informers in the Sanctuary Movement, BASTA!, Oct. 1985, 9 (reprinted
from THE NATION, June 20/27, 1985).
143 Id.
"- Id. at 10.
"I See, e.g., Res. No. 8565 adopted by the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), resolving that
the denomination "protests the unwarranted and clandestine eavesdropping of church meetings by
undercover agents of the government of the United States as a serious threat to the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom and the separation of church and state."
'- Government actions or practices may not operate so as to discourage the exercise of a con-
stitutional right. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
" Nute, Free Exercise of Religion in Phoenix, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, 728 (August 14-21, 1985).
"4 See Blodgett, Alien Search: Churches Allege U.S. Spying, A.B.A. 31 (April 1986). A similar
suit was filed May 7, 1985, by the National Lawyer's Guild and the Center for Constitutional Rights.
See Of International Law & Religious Freedom, GurLD NOTES (Summer 1985).
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Church, and several local congregations affiliated with these denominations (in-
cluding Southside Presbyterian and Alzona Evangelical Lutheran). They alleged
that the infiltration violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth amendments; and that
"Operation Sojourner" involved taping of noncriminal behavior, thus intimi-
dating people from exercising constitutional freedoms. 49 The plaintiffs therefore
requested a declaratory judgment to proclaim the INS practices illegal and thus
to establish a precedent for the protection of free exercise of religion against
unwarranted governmental intrusion."'' 0 Action on the suit has been suspended
pending resolution of the present criminal trial.
In the Tucson criminal trial, the defense filed a motion to dismiss based upon
free exercise of religion, and the prosecution filed motions to preclude the use
of certain defenses, including religious motivations for actions. 5' The trial judge
issued an order on July 24, 1985, denying the motion to dismiss and granting
the prosecution's motion to prevent presentation of evidence or arguments relating
to "(1) defendants' religious beliefs and (2) enforcement of immigration laws as
an unconstitutional restraint on defendant's religious beliefs."',1 2 Thus, the latest
trial was resolved without reference to a free exercise defense. 53
On May 1, 1986, the jury convicted 8 of the 11 defendants of various com-
binations of the impending charges, the most serious of which were six convictions
on conspiracy charges. 54 Among those convicted were the Rev. John Fife, Sister Dar-
lene Nicgorski, and Philip Willis-Conger; Jim Corbett was acquitted.' 55 These
convictions followed intense debate among the jurors over the propriety of en-
forcing criminal penalties against sanctuary workers, but were perhaps inevitable
given the disallowance of defenses.5 6 Nevertheless, all of the convicted defendants
were given probation. 1
7
'1 First Amended Complaint counts 30-31 at 9, Presbyterian Church v. U.S. No. Cir. 86-0072
(D. Ariz.).
Id. at 2-3.
See Blodgett, Sanctuary: Church Workers Face Trial, A.B.A.J. 19 (April 1985); N.Y. Times,
Jan. 27, 1985, at 12.
Order of July 24, 1985 at 2, United States v. Aguilar, No. Cir. 85-8 (D. Ariz.).
"' The rejection of any defense based on religion also caused a stir in the community. For
example, the General Board on Church and Society of the United Methodist Church adopted a state-
ment noting the court's action and stating,
[W]e denounce such denigration of the Church's mission and affirm the right of religious
freedom and the principle of separation of church and state in the context of sanctuary...
We encourage the courts to be more mindful of the historic right of the institutional Church
to determine for itself its ministry and witness especially in areas where they conflict with
the interest of the state.
Affirming the Churches Right to Self-Determination Through the Provision of Sanctuary, (Adopted
October 3, 1985).
- Mattews, Jury Convicts 8 Sanctuary Defendants, Washington Post, May 2, 1986, at 1, col.
'" 6 Convicted of Plot to Smuggle Aliens; 5 Cleared on Count, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1986, at
col. I.
", Pacelle, Sanctuary Jurys' Dilemna: Law or Justice? Am. LAW. 95 (Sept. 1986).
' Yaroshefsky, Reflections on the Tucson Sanctuary Trial, BASTA!, Sept. 1986, at 22.
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The constitutional issue of applying the free exercise clause to the sanctuary
movement has never been addressed squarely by an appellate court. The trial
court in Jack Elder's first trial rejected the defense in a published order, 58 but
Elder was acquitted and thus the order was never challenged on appeal. Such a
defense was also rejected, without written opinion, by the trial court in one of
Stacey Mertk's trials, but the issue was not raised on appeal.'5 9 The defense has
now been rejected in the recent prosecution, but may arise again in the event
of an appeal. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to evaluate the sanctuary move-
ment in light of the current free exercise analysis.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Contemporary Interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has recognized circum-
stances under which the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment' 60 provides an exemption from application of otherwise valid laws and reg-
ulations. The first case to explicitly adopt such an exception was Sherbert v.
Verner.161 In it, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing test to be used when
considering such an exemption. If the state action infringed upon the exercise of
a person's religion, then the government, in order to sustain its action, must have
a compelling state interest in the enforcement of the law.'
62
This test was refined further in Wisconsin v. Yoder,163 decided eight years
later. In Yoder, Amish parents were granted an exemption from compulsory ed-
ucation requirements, allowing them to withdraw their children from school two
years earlier than was mandated by law, in order to accommodate Amish religious
beliefs. 64 In granting the exemption, the Court utilized the Sherbert concept that
the government can override religious freedoms only by a showing of compelling
118 Elder, 601, F. Supp. 1574.
Merkt, 764 F.2d at 270.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise therefore. . ." U.S. Corsr. amend. I (emphasis added).
16 Sherbert v. Verner, 374, U.S. 398 (1963). Mrs. Sherbert was a Seventh Day Adventist, whose
faith required her to observe a Saturday sabbath. This conflicted with her job, and resulted in her
firing. She sought unemployment benefits, but was denied compensation on the grounds that she had
refused available work. Mrs. Sherbert brought suit requesting a religious exemption from the disquali
fication provisions of the statute.
1 Id. at 403.
6 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
' The court found that the parents:
[B]elieved, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities generally, that
their children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life. They believed that by sending their children to high shcool, they
would not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church community,
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state interest. The analysis in Yoder more clearly explained how these interests
were to be identified.
The first determination to be made in the balancing process is whether gov-
ernment action in fact imposes a burden on religious activity. This could obviously
involve courts unnecessarily in defining religious practices. However, the Supreme
Court was concerned that it not give free license to the exercise of personal phi-
losophy, as opposed to organized religious belief.16S There is an underlying concern
in all free exercise exemption cases that courts not "permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself."' 66 In a subsequent case, the Court clarified its position on
interpreting religious beliefs when it held that "courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation."' 67 The degree of scrutiny, therefore, seems to be low.
The Yoder court resolved the issue of burden upon religious belief in favor
of the Amish, stressing four points: (1) the belief was shared by an organized
group; (2) it was founded in an interpretation of religious literature; (3) the system
of beliefs pervaded and regulated the daily lives of adherents; and (4) the system
had been in existence for a substantial period of time. 68 These limitations were
probably imposed in order to limit exceptions based upon practices of lifestyle
to those groups society would recognize as traditional or legitimate. 69 This concern
would presumably not be as strong in considering an application of the analysis
to the sanctuary movement.
The second step of the Yoder free exercise analysis begins after a burden is
found to be imposed upon religion; the focus then shifts to the nature of the
government's interest in the regulation. The mere fact that the regulation is of
a general nature will not alone preserve its constitutionality. 70 The Court in Yoder
went back to the Sherbert balancing test and held that "only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion."' 7' The test therefore requires a comparison be-
tween the interest the government is asserting and the imposition alleged by the
religious party. However, the Court made it clear that the government interest
" Id. at 215-16.
Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
' ' Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). The Court noted
that where there are differences of opinion within a particular creed, courts should not attempt to
resolve the conflict by choosing a correct view. Therefore, so long as the belief arises in the context
of an established religion, it seems that the courts will not exercise a searching review of the legitimacy
of the belief. Id. at 715-17.
J . NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1059 (2d ed., 1983); Yoder, 406
U.S. at 215-17.
-, "The 'countercultural' movement was before the eyes of the Court, and its opinion appears
to want to say 'yes' to the Amish while saying 'no' to the hippies." Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and
Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 335 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
"10 "A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." Yoder,
406 U.S. at 220.
M' Id. at 215.
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to be weighed in the balancing test was not to be the overall interest of the
government in the general area of regulation, but the interest in applying the
regulation to the particular religious group claiming an exemption.'72 If this gov-
ernment interest cannot outweigh the infringement, the exemption should be
granted.
The third element of the analysis enunciated in Yoder was to be invoked
where the state had shown that its interests outweighed the imposition on religious
freedom imposed by the government action. If this is so, the government must
finally show that there is no less restrictive means of imposing the regulation.
This is implied in the balancing test, which allows important interests, "and those
not otherwise served" ,73 to outweigh free exercise considerations. This element of
the test is stated more clearly in a later case: "The state may justify an inroad
on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest."' 74
Wisconsin v. Yoder established the basic test to be used in considering free
exercise exemptions today. However, one modification must be noted before that
test may be applied to the sanctuary movement. In 1982, the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Lee'75 which, while following the Yoder format, suggested
a shift in the operation of the balancing test.
Lee, like Yoder, involved the Amish. The exemption being requested in Lee
was from paying social security taxes, since the Amish did not believe in receiving
aid from the government and therefore would not accept social security benefits. 6
The Supreme Court accepted the contention of the Amish that compulsory with-
holding of taxes did place a burden on their exercise of religion, 77 but denied
the exemption on the grounds that the government had met its burden of showing
a compelling state interest. 78 The method by which they did so is instructive. The
government interest in the withholding was defined as the fiscal vitality of the
comprehensive insurance system, and was equated with the interest in the national
income tax system. This would seem to contradict the approach taken in Yoder,
which would have suggested that the government interest in withholding social
"- Thus, in Yoder, the Court responded to the contention by the state of Wisconsin that the
state interest was in preserving compulsory education by stating:
Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake... we cannot accept such a
sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly
examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory
education at age 16, and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recog-
nizing the claimed Amish exemption.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added).
PI Id. at 215.
174 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
"I United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
,, The trial court found that "the Amish believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly
and needy and therefore are religiously opposed to the national social security system." Id. at 255.
I Id. at 257.
119 Id. at 260-61.
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security taxes from the Amish alone be weighed against the burden such an action
would place upon the exercise of their religion.
79
In another shift, the Supreme Court did not even mention the less restrictive
means element of the Yoder analysis. It is unclear whether this is no longer
included as an element of the analysis, or whether it has simply been subsumed
in the Lee statement of the balancing test. Whereas Yoder spoke in terms of the
interest of the state being sufficient to outweigh the exercise of religion,8 0 Lee
phrases the test as follows: "[W]hether accommodating the [exercise of religion]
will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest."''
Thus, Lee may have altered the analysis under which free exercise claims are
analyzed, both by inflating the government interest to be considered and by shift-
ing the balancing test to a consideration of how accommodating the belief would
interfere with that interest. 82 However, the Court also seemed concerned with the
fact that Lee dealt with taxes, and it is unclear to what degree the analysis might
differ in a less sensitive area.
B. Applicability of Free Exercise Analysis to Sanctuary
By using the preceding first amendment analysis, it should be possible to
evaluate the contemporary sanctuary movement in the context of modern free
exercise jurisprudence. The test which will be used is the Yoder analysis, with
references to possible modifications by Lee.
1. Religious Motivation
The first step in any free exercise case is to show that the challenged conduct
was motivated by religious belief. This must be shown by the person claiming
the exemption before the burden shifts back to the government to show its in-
terest. In the context of sanctuary, this threshhold issue could conceivably cause
problems for adherents claiming an exemption. One persistent criticism of the
movement has been that it is not religious in nature, but is instead simply another
form of political protest against U.S. policies in Central America. 83
"'9 See supra, note 175 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens noted this fact in his concurrence
when he stated "if we confine the analysis to the Government's interest in rejecting the particular
claim to an exemption at stake in this case, the constitutional standard as formulated by the Court
has not been met.... The court overstates the magnitude of this risk [difficulty in processing claims]
because the Amish applies only to a small religious community with an established welfare system
of its own." Lee, 455 U.S. at 262 (Stevens, J. concurring) (Emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.
' For a criticism of the recent trend in analyzing free exercise claims. See Pepper, The Co-
nundrum of the Free Exercise Clause - Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REv. 265
(1982).
110 R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 44 (statement by Bob Eastbrook, INS). See
also Zall, Asylum and Sanctuary: The American Dilemna A.B.A.J. (Aug. 1, 1986), Carro, Sanctuary:
The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient
Privilege? 54 U. CN. L. REv. 747 (1986).
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In fact, there has been significant tension within the sanctuary movement
between those who feel that they are part of a religious movement and those who
feel that sanctuary should be more political-attempting to stop the flow of ref-
ugees by improving the conditions in the countries from which they are fleeing
and by raising public awareness through the statements of the refugees. ,84 To some
extent this division represents differing perceptions on the nature of this religious
practice. In its January 1985 newsletter, the CRTF published an article entitled
"Some Considerations on Direction for the Sanctuary Movement," which argued
that,
[Tjhe sanctuary movement is profoundly religious but inevitably political.... All
social religious activity is inevitably political, from Amish resistance to public
schools to Protestant opposition to U.S. - Vatican diplomacy, from Roman Cath-
olic teaching on abortion to our opposition to U.S. support for war in Central
America. These political positions are made by fundamentally religious organi-
zations operating with religious motivations and purposes."
t
5
The religious motivations of people within the sanctuary movement may simply
lead to activity which can be labelled in different ways.
Beyond these definitional problems, differences of opinion within the move-
ment exist regarding tactics and public stances. For the present analysis, however,
that is irrelevant because the sanctuary movement in its entirety is not asserting
the free exercise right - individuals are. Those individuals are generally able to
demonstrate religious motivations for their actions. 8 6 Evidence of religious mo-
tivation may be found in the widespread support from national denominations," 7
as well as the numerous local denominations which have declared themselves to
be sanctuaries. An amicus curiae brief filed by various national denominations
during the appeal by Stacey Merkt described this religious foundation:
The Sanctuary Movement for Salvadoran refugees is but a current manifestation
of a religious doctrine rooted in, and central to, the Judeo-Christian tradition....
The command that Church groups and Church people give sanctuary to refugees
is a sustained and prominent theme of biblical teaching. It begins with the concept
of sanctuary and cities of refuge in the Old Testament and extends through the
understanding of the individual as God's holy sanctuary in the New Testament
command of love. The roots are deep and strong. God's voice is clear and un-
mistakable. '
Given this religious support, and the fact that courts will not evaluate religious
beliefs very stringently, this portion of the analysis can probably be satisfied.
See generally Korn, supra note 2, at 29-30; BAsrA!, Jan. 1985.
" BASTA!, supra note I11.
It should be noted that the prosecutions thus far have been directed almost exclusively against
sanctuary workers affiliated with the "Tuscon" wing of the movement. One of the defendents in the
present trial, Sister Darlene Nicgorski, worked for the CRTF, but in the border area.
' See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
" Amicus Brief, supra note 26, at 10-11.
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In the one reported decision dealing with a free exercise claim by a sanctuary
worker (Jack Elder), this claim was met. 89 The district court judge heard extensive
testimony from religious leaders stating that sanctuary was an appropriate expres-
sion of Christianity.190 The court recognized that other Catholics could disagree
with Elder's actions, but held that he "fulfilled his Christian obligations as he
genuinely perceived them to be and that [he] presented substantial testimony to
support his view of Christianity."'' 9' It would seem therefore that, given adequate
support in the record, sanctuary members could meet their initial burden of proof.
2. Governmental Interest
The real difficulty in a sanctuary-free exercise analysis arises in balancing the
exercise of belief with the interests of the government. As noted earlier, the orig-
inal mandate in Yoder was that the state's interest be defined narrowly, in terms
of the specific exemption being requested. 9 2 Analogizing to the present situation,
the government interest might be characterized as that in enforcing immigration
procedures against those refugees fleeing political violence in El Salvador and
Guatemala who are being aided by the sanctuary movement. This number would
presumably constitute a small fraction of the total refugee flow from those coun-
tries, and would be minuscule when compared to the entire influx of Central
Americans. The government interest would be reduced accordingly. Furthermore,
the nature of the government's interest is in maintaining control over the refugee
flow through enforcement of immigration laws. Given the fact that many of those
against whom the INS is now seeking to assert governmental control probably
deserve to be granted refugee status under existing law, the actual governmental
interest here is narrow. Thus, if the analysis is conducted in a manner most
favorable to the sanctuary movement, it might seem that the governmental interest
is sufficiently low to be outweighed by the burden placed on sanctuary worker's
beliefs by imprisonment.
There are however several problems with this analysis, beyond the fact that
Lee would indicate that the interests should be defined differently. Courts are
simply going to be reluctant to sanction any means of bypassing established im-
migration procedures. While the INS may have a valid right to deport only those
refugees who do not meet the statutory criteria, they will undoubtedly assert a
right to evaluate the merits of all claims. The interests of the government also
extend beyond simply evaluating specific refugee claims. For example, the gov-
ernment might also raise the potential impact of refugee admissions on its foreign
relations with other countries. While this might require an admission of the po-
litical considerations in asylum adjudication, it would also place the issue in an
area in which courts would be reluctant to proceed.'1 3 In fact, the entire field of
Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574.
' Id. at 1577.
" Id. at 1578.
191 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
" Under the "political question doctrine," courts will refrain from exercising review over po-
litical matters, such as foreign affairs. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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immigration law has often been treated with deference by the judiciary. 94
Beyond these problems in identifying the relevant interests are some basic
difficulties of definition, both in terms of the sanctuary workers entitled to pro-
tection and the refugees entitled to safe passage. An exemption would potentially
involve courts in determining who is or is not a "legitimate" sanctuary worker.
While the movement is now composed of persons with sincere religious beliefs,
the decentralized informal nature of the movement would make it difficult to
insure that such would continue to be the case. Also, while many of the refugees
protected are fleeing political violence, some probably are not. The sanctuary
movement gives aid to refugees without distinction and thus deals with those who
are legitimate targets of enforcement in the eyes of the government. Finally, courts
will be reluctant to proclaim that the Refugee Act is being enforced selectively,
and to announce a means of circumventing it entirely.
These problems in defining the governmental interest reflect an underlying
concern raised by the issue of a sanctuary-free exercise exemption. There is a
qualitative difference between allowing a person to avoid a compulsory education
requirement and allowing them to avoid a felony criminal statute. The penalty
which the sanctuary workers seek to avoid, five years in prison and a $2,000 fine,
and the nature of their activity, bringing undocumented aliens into the country,
seem to place this religious practice in opposition to stronger governmental in-
terests than those which were present in the other free exercise cases.
If these problems appear to dim the chances of winning a sanctuary-free
exercise exemption, U.S. v. Lee extinguishes them altogether. Lee indicated a trend
toward inflating the government interest by characterizing it as the entire interest
in the area of regulation rather than that which is being asserted against the
individual religious adherent. In the present case, the government might well assert
its interest in maintaining a coherent immigration policy and stemming the tide
of illegal aliens. 95
That is precisely how the court in U.S. v. Elder characterized this interest.
The court held that "the Government meets its burden to demonstrate an ov-
erriding interest in protecting a congressionally-sanctioned immigration and nat-
uralization system designed to maintain the integrity of this Nation's borders." '96
Once the government interest is cast in these terms it will be virtually impossible
to show any religious interest which could counterbalance it. The Elder court,
1 The Supreme Court has historically deferred to Congress in decisions regarding terms for
immigration and naturalization. See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 168, at 703;
Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Attorney General discretion in allowing entry of aliens
is not limited by the First Amendment); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (a different standard
of review is applied to laws applicable to aliens).
91 The area of immigration is similar to that of taxation (at issue in Lee) in terms of the high
government interest.
I" Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1578.
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however, did characterize its balancing test in Yoder terminology rather than in
the phrasing of Lee."w
3. Less Restrictive Alternative
Although not mentioned in Lee, this was the third component of the Yoder
analysis, and is still presumably a second burden which the government must
meet. The district court in Elder recognized this element, but gave it little weight,
stating that "the Government must retain the sole authority to determine who
may cross the borders or travel further within the country."'' 98 In holding that
there was no less restrictive method of enforcement, the court raised the spectre
of individually-created personal immigration policies, and of the masses of people
who might also be proper objects of Christian charity.
The court in Elder closed out its free exercise analysis by noting the existence
of asylum adjudication procedures, and using this as a further justification for
finding no less restrictive alternatives "since nothing in this decision prohibits the
exercise of Christian charity to those who present themselves before the INS to
apply for asylum and who proceed under the INS rules."' 99 This cryptic statement
ignored the fact that it was the selective enforcement of those procedures that
led to the perceived need for sanctuary in the first place.
That comment does, however, suggest a potential less restrictrive alternative
to prosecution-proper enforcement of the Refugee Act of 1980 (possibly by adopting
standards currently utilized by the United Nations). This would promote the govern-
ment interest of stemming the flow of undocumented aliens into this country by re-
ducing the number of undocumented political refugees seeking assistance from
the sanctuary movement, and it would certainly impose a lower burden on sanc-
tuary workers than imprisonment. There are two problems with this proposal.
First, it would require judicial recognition of the fact that asylum adjudication
is currently being administered improperly, which is not likely to occur. Second,
this alternative is not directly related to the enforcement procedures the religious
adherents seek to avoid. Asylum adjudication is carried out independently from
prosecutions for transporting illegal aliens, and while its administration might have
an effect on such prosecutions in this situation, courts would probably be reluctant
to link the two.
V. CONCLUSION
The possibility of obtaining an exemption from prosecution on the grounds
of first amendment freedoms is therefore very remote. The type of government
,9' The court in Elder stated that when the burden shifted to the government to justify enforce-
ment of the limitation, it "must show that such limitations are essential to accomplish a compelling
governmental interest." Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1577. The equivalent characterization in Lee was
"whether accommodating the [religious] belief will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the govern-
mental interest." Lee, 455 U.S. at 259. Elder is therefore consistent with the original balancing tests
from Shebert and Yoder.
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interest involved, and the highly political nature of the issue, make it unlikely
that any court would find such a religious exemption. It is worth noting that
religious defenses were raised in the recent Tucson prosecution of sanctuary workers.
The district court judge denied the motion, finding that:
1) The power to regulate and control the admission or exclusion of aliens is a
fundamental sovereign attribute;
2) The immigration laws of the United States promote a compelling state interest;
3) The inference, if any, with religious practices resulting from application of the
immigration laws is minimal and incidental;
4) The enforcement of immigration laws does not constitute a violation of defen-
dants' right,; under [the First Amendment];
5) There is no court mandated religious exemption from [criminal sanctions for
transporting illegal aliens] and this Court shall not interfere with Congress' authority
to regulate immigration pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution;
6) Religious leaders and persons of religious convictions have the same obligation
as all citizens and persons present within this country to comply with constitutional
statutes and regulations. 200
This ruling accurately summarizes the prevailing judical attitude towards such a
free exercise claim.
The major problem in asserting such a claim is the difficulty of meeting the
analytical standard created in United States v. Lee. The Court has deviated from
its earlier approach and has begun a practice of inflating the relevant government
interest to the extent that any religious claimant would have difficulty meeting
the required standard. This reflects the unwillingness demonstrated by courts to-
wards granting religious exemptions from regulated activities. It will certainly pose
a significant barrier to gaining such an exemption in this case.
The current form of analysis seems unlikely to change soon, so any future
sanctuary claims will continue to be evaluated under Lee. It is unlikely that the
rejection of a religious exemption will have a catastrophic effect on sanctuary
however. The sanctuary movement was never premised on the existence of con-
stitutional protection, and the leaders of the movement have demonstrated a will-
ingness to undergo prosecution for the exercise of their beliefs.2 0' That fact alone
might reflect a true measure of the sincerity of religious beliefs involved in sanc-
tuary and the likelihood of its continuance. Given the growth of the movement
n" Order, supra note 152.
n In the absence of a constitutional exemption, one possible protection for sanctuary workers
in criminal prosecutions is jury nullification - the refusal of a jury to enforce laws in a manner
which they perceive to be unfair. For a debate over the merits of this practice, see Osterman and
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since the beginning of the prosecutions, 2 2 it seems probable that volunteers will
be available and active within the movement. Given the recent history of Central
America, it would appear that refugees will continue to enter this country in need
of assistance. Therefore, with or without constitutional approval, the sanctuary
movement will continue to assert what it believes to be its "God-given right to
aid anyone fleeing from persecution and murder.
' 20 3
Carl W. Levander
Prior to the indictments, there were less than 200 sanctuaries, ten months later there were
over 270; U.S. Government Attacks Sanctuary While Escalating War, BASTA!, Dec. 1985, 8. For a
report of one church's decision to become a sanctuary after the indictments, see National Catholic
Reporter, March 15, 1985, at 7.
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